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The industrialized early 20th-century society of 
William Carlos Williams' America drives ahead in 
pursuit  of scientific knowledge and new 
technology, both creating and collaterally 
suffering broad-scale human calamity. 
Responding  to  the  post-Depression  and  post- 
World War II era of America, Williams reports on 
a crisis in the field of letters: "the construction of 
our poems…is left shamefully to the past" (Essays 
337). Such an ineffectual state of affairs for 
poetry is for Williams symptomatic of a more 
general crisis in human knowledge, the pursuit of 
which has been co-opted by political institutions 
and by industrial enterprise, which lack any artful 
linguistic or communicative elements. In updating 
the "construction" of poetry, Williams recognizes 
the need for new bases of knowledge and the 
language that both instantiates it and, he will find, 
is also one of its constitutive elements. Such a 
need  can  only be  satisfied  for Williams by a 
thorough attention to poetic process and poetic 
act;  indeed,  there  is  call  for  a  technique  of 
constructive listening, having its anthropological 
basis in music as a cultural practice and artifact. 
Williams must recover his poetic project from the 
failure of outdated forms, taking from the raw 
material of modern noise the reality of a modern 
poetic measure itself. New form in this sense can 
only be derived from content given, but it requires 
in this a new approach to poetic expression in 
order that the form is not abstractly free or chaotic. 
Williams' attempt at uncovering this approach is to 
use the artifice of poetic measure to create a space, 
which, in its inception, enacts a language of a 
modern urban reality, namely the "resemblance 
between the mind of modern man and a city" 
(Paterson xiii).  In essence he must inhabit the 
poetic process itself in order to engage its subject 
and make its language "recognizable" (xiii). This 
paper aims to show how Williams' treatise on 
measure is borne out in the musical versification 
of language in Paterson's five books.  Particular 
emphasis on process embodied in place emerges 
from Book Two with "Sunday in the Park" and the 
pacing walk of Mr. Paterson.  This innovation of 
organic form operates to the end of Williams' 
broader philosophical commitments to music in 
language, knowledge, love, and culture. 
When Williams speaks of a poem as a "field 
of action" (Essays 280), he treats the crafting of 
poetry itself  as a disciplinary field or area of 
knowledge, but expresses a more literal sense of 
the word, 'field,' as place for growth or space for 
development. He invokes a fidelity of or fealty to 
experience and process, where knowledge and 
meaning are at least partly fluid and contingent 
upon present experience. Williams is concerned 
with guidance through chaos, a "new measure 
consonant with our time and not a mode so rotten 
that it stinks" (Essays 339), which can allow his 
living poem and life in poetry to continue. In this 
he also speaks to a general cultural malaise, 
having its vein in an anthropological project that 
recognizes the ethnography of place–the 
revelation of the dynamics within a city, Paterson, 
New Jersey, from early settlement through to its 
place in contemporary industrial America and a 
man, the titular figure who Williams projects as 
"N. F. PATERSON!" (Paterson 15) and reveals 
through "THE GRRRREAT HISTORY of that / 
old time Jersey Patriot" (15). 
Paterson is no partial treatment by Williams, 
though it remains unfinished. This later work 
treats of Williams' career-long pursuit of meaning 
in action through rhythm, an early example being 
his notes on "Speech Rhythm" in 1913: "No 
action, no creative action is complete but a period 
from a greater action going in rythmic [sic] 
course, i.e., an Odyssey is rightly considered not 
an isolate unit but a wave of a series from hollow 
through crest to hollow. No part in it's [sic] 
excellence but partakes of the essential nature of 
the whole." (1). It is remarkable that there is a 
ratio of rudiment between allegory to archetype 
implied in this statement, even as Williams does 
not fully explicate what he means by "an 
Odyssey." Williams' approach demands our 
attention to be flexible and to be current, and this 
demand stems not from random irregularity of 
verse, but from measuring sound in its invention 
by spoken language. Stephen Adams in Poetic 
Designs contrasts meter and rhythm in a way that 
may help us so define measure: "'Meter' refers to 
the abstract model for poetic measure, 'rhythm' to 
the actual sound and inflection of the free give- 
and pauses within 
line" (2).  Taking it as a verb, measure then is 
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best viewed as an acting or bearing out of meter. 
This interpretation–there is no measure but in the 
act–stands to compare to musical applications, 
where measure is both the enactment of musical 
meter and the space in which this act is defined. 
Rhythm, in its substance, makes the act possible. 
Amiri Baraka, the African-American poet and an 
early disciple of Williams' ideas about prosody, in 
"How You Sound??," sums up the project: "…all 
this means that we want to go into a quantitative 
verse…Accentual verse, the regular metric of 
rumbling iambics, is dry as slivers of sand. 
Nothing happens in that frame anymore. We can 
get nothing from England" (645). Far from 
"rumbling iambics" (Baraka 645), Charles Olson 
and other post-WWII, postmodern contemporaries 
of Williams are committing to an organic or Open 
Form, derived from particular prosodic content 
present in prosaic speech, which by its measure is 
creative of a holistic attitude to poetry, with an 
emphasis on poetic function in its commonality, 
its ubiquity. Paterson then may be read as an 
early pro-genesis of the prosodic sensibility 
required for developing the Open Form as these 
later poets have done, where the poet's act of 
measure is both essential and emergent, while it is 
neither inherited nor reductive. 
The meaning of prosodic device, over literal 
narrative, is speech meaning, which we take up in 
technique and simple measure.  Denise Levertov 
defines organic form, in part, to be "based on an 
intuition of an order, a form beyond forms, in 
which forms partake, and of which man's creative 
works are  analogies, resemblances, natural 
allegories.   Such poetry is exploratory" (629). 
The poetic process, for adherents to an Open Form 
philosophy, enacts such an intuition by bringing it 
back   to   body,   to   experience.  'Embodied' 
knowledge in this sense depends upon a 'body' of 
language, a poetic embodiment structured through 
prosodic elements, which live in temporal space as 
sound, shape and cognition.  Knowledge in the 
craft, the act of creation, depends on a sense of 
language used as experience, beyond its 
transparent application in conveying the meaning 
of experience. In his introduction to Williams' The 
Embodiment  of  Knowledge,  Ron  Loewinsohn 
describes Williams' approach to knowledge as 
"making  a  case  for…a  nonrefential  theory  of 
language in the 'field of letters'" (xvii).  In other 
words, rather than simply symbolizing, or standing 
for  objects  in  their  bare  meaning,  signs  for 
Williams enact objects.  The linguistic school of 
Russian "formalism" had a similar emphasis on 
texture  and  the  uses  of  poetic  language  over 
practical language (Eichenbaum 1066). Taken 
referentially, 'meaning' and apprehension arrest 
the experience of language, and disembodies it to 
irreducible formula, something of the atomic, 
radiant "gist" celebrated by nuclear physicists 
(Williams, Paterson 184), which our poet 
compares to the vacuous concept of money or 
credit. Ecologically speaking, language so 
employed denotes knowledge by "dissection" as 
opposed to knowledge by "creation" (Berry). 
Wendell  Berry  critiques  the  usefulness  of 
knowledge derived from analytical science in a 
recent essay, "The Melancholy of Anatomy."  As 
it stands for pure reason, such knowledges "within 
the welter of our experience is limited and weak" 
(Berry).   Referring  to our contemporary 
economics,  Berry  argues  that  industrialization 
prevents us from recognizing holistic experience. 
The way industries regard "landscapes as sources 
of extractable products" represents for Berry "the 
disembodiment   of   thought,"   by  which   "the 
scientific-industrial culture,  founded  nominally 
upon materialism, arrives at  a sort  of 
fundamentalist disdain for material reality" (3). 
He frames his argument in the tradition of William 
Butler Yeats and other modern poets, whom he 
quotes: "We only believe in those thoughts which 
have been conceived not in the brain but in the 
whole  body  (introduction  to  Ezra  Pound  and 
Ernest Fenollosa's Certain Noble Plays of Japan)" 
(Berry). For Berry, the modern industrial age 
begets Nature as commodity and we even begin to 
perceive  our  experience  of  it  as  such;  Yeats' 
"foreboding…'mechanical  sequence  of  ideas,"' 
like a  coldly-calculated view, is the 
"mentalization" or ideation1 which Berry attacks at 
large in the order of the Western world.  Yeats, 
Pound, Eliot, H. D., Moore, Williams and other of 
their  contemporaries  are  influenced 
philosophically  by  a  modern  alienation  from 
nature, taking their cue from Emerson, who asked, 
"Why  should  not  we  also  enjoy  an  original 
relation to the universe?," since "[t]he sun shines 
to-day also rises" (496). Emerson's essay "Nature" 
argues for a "NOT ME" definition of "NATURE," 
"that is, both nature and art" (497), and that the 
"Soul" accounts for all experience of self (cf. 
Cartesian dualism), as distinct from these both. 
We may use this dichotomy to reflect on Williams' 
crisis of disembodiment, self separate from nature 
as form has been separated from content in the 
making of poetry. 
With regard to prosody, mechanized 
production may be the new background; but it has 
 
1 See Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 
"ideation, n (1818): the forming of ideas (as of things 
not present to the senses)" 
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rhythms, symbolized by Williams in Paterson as 
"twos and fours" (45), industrial inputs and 
outputs, "up and down /…using such plugs" (164- 
165), as if in a body performed with mindless 
logic. Canadian composer R. Murray Schafer 
documents a contemporary description of this 
emerging sound experience in his work The 
Soundscape, quoting Luigi Russolo from 1913: 
"machines create today such a large number of 
varied noises that pure 'sound,' with its littleness 
and its monotony, now fails to arouse any 
emotion" (Schafer 111). This notion of "reversal 
of figure and ground," which Schaeffer 
recognizes, means that mechanical  noise is 
foregrounded. Here then is one category of 
material "noise" for Williams, working in a way 
that can be measured, a type of new ground 
against which to establish textured response. For 
Williams, modern poetic process requires a 
"footing" on which to withstand the dominance of 
'Science and Philosophy' as categories of 
knowledge in the economic, political and cultural 
life of early-twentieth century: "[the] predominant 
influence upon our lives attributable to these two 
categories of understanding has grown…to the 
virtual exclusion of other categories–notably art– 
is demonstrable daily" (Embodiment 85). With 
respect to ideation, he is not saying that we should 
treat 'mental activity' as such with any prejudicial 
disdain, but in fact that we must beware the "end" 
to which scientific and philosophical pursuits 
themselves "preclude thought" (85). Williams 
likens the purpose of art to a "head" that is lacking 
from the "anatomy and physiology" of science and 
philosophy (85). This head alone is able to will 
such knowledge into action, through a process of 
embodiment. 
Stephen Cushman addresses Williams' poetic 
process, an embodiment to break down the duality 
of form and content, as it may be described from 
reading "The Desert Music." He is careful to 
point out that, by measuring and counting, 
Williams' goal is not to arrive at any abstract 
formula of quantification.  Rather, Cushman 
argues, "measure is a trope of mimesis:" 
 
Williams establishes a metonymic relation 
between how the poem says what must be 
said and the idea of measuring….How 
shall we get said what must be said?  By 
means of measuring what we must say 
with imitation.  Although formal scheme 
will  inevitable  figure  in  the  mimetic 
project, it is only a part of that project. 
Many misreadings of Williams, as well as 
some of his own confusions, originate 
here, in the inference that he is saying 
reductively, the way to make poems that 
say something is to invent a nonmetrical 
formal scheme based on  pseudo- 
quantitative theory. (138) 
 
Imitation departs from quantification by way of 
iteration. Alliteration is especially a creative force 
for Williams, even as the poet tips his hand in a 
kind of obliteration, to reveal the meaningless acts 
entailed   in   the   process:  e.g.   "how  [howl]" 
(Paterson 17), "beauty –/ torn to shreds by the / 
lurking schismatists" (71), and "The descent / 
made up of despairs" (79), the "inarticulate" (54). 
This re-living without repetition is the poet's 
'muse:' "Music it for yourself," the persona of 
Paterson implores us (29), and to do so one need 
look no further than to simple prosodic device. 
Alliterative  phrasing,  for  example,  in  its  self- 
referential quality, offers a kind of condensed unit 
of measure.  As a phrase, "a bush shakes" (19), 
provides more than just an  example  of 
onomatopoeia. It is also an example of the poet's 
statement on knowledge and identity, as a bush 
sounds in / responds to its environment. It is 
resonant, living, "green" (19).  Hence, we are 
discussing measure in a metaphorical sense, as 
Cushman points out. However, the consonance of 
"sh" as a sound in the spoken verses provides at 
least  a  self-reflexive  measure,  a  repetition  of 
textural features in their spoken, temporal qualities 
(cf. "nonsense language," Eichenbaum 1068). 
In Paterson, the Poet's challenge is to create 
beauty through such uses of language as 
embodiment of experience out of "complexities," 
the "particulars" (3) of experience. He can speak, 
as poet, of a "certain knowledge," to be dispersed 
in saving his self from the "undoing" of ignorance 
(4). Such knowledge is "engaged" (85) with its 
subject. It is not a priori, formed purely in the 
mind. Nor is it ensconced in the Library, as "The 
Library is desolation" (101), knowledge so filed is 
disembodied, having been devised, in a sense, "to 
lead the mind away" (96). Williams' central thesis 
grapples with language, which "divorced from 
their / minds" (12), leads Paterson's "thousand 
automatons" to drift, through ideation, out of the 
body of their experience and the texture of their 
voice in it. Invoking his creative persona, he 
places the subject's behaviour on the plain of "just 
another dog" (3), being vulgar and base in its 
expression. As poet William considers himself a 
"lame" one, on "three legs" able to speak but not 
follow, in a sense (3). He could be of even lesser 
value than those other agile dogs in his park scene, 
yet he is superior in his measure of the situation, 
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and in his responsiveness to the many other dogs, 
capable in the knowledge that "the beginning is 
assuredly / the end" (3), and capable in creating 
his basic measure. Indeed, for the promise of 
embodiment, an act of love for the poetic must 
likewise be an act of destruction, e.g. in naming as 
"Beautiful thing!" a burning building of books 
(100). 
Consider now the 'finishing touches' of any 
so-called perfected form, which leaves nothing for 
fashioning exchange, to the touch, to struggle 
with–old forms are too neat, too calculated, 
Williams might argue. Modeled upon the 
"resemblance between the mind of modern man 
and a city," Williams conceived Paterson in "four 
books following the course of the river," but he 
was "drawn on" by the theme of the poem, the 
"noise of the Falls [that] seemed to be a language 
which we were and are seeking" (xiv). He could 
not stop writing, or he could not finish–in any case 
the project was not complete with Book Five, and 
partial drafts of a sixth book were discovered at 
Williams' death.  This is the spark of continual 
regeneration necessary to engage art on a 'modern' 
footing, where "the serious poet has admitted the 
whole armamentarium of the industrial age to his 
poems–" (Williams, Essays 282). A serious reader 
of poetry meanwhile gives her own breath to the 
enactment of the language, in a voice that is 
responsive to every line; her participation is 
required to complete the composition, taking up its 
shapes and signs. Denise Levertov, a 
correspondent and late contemporary of Williams, 
describes such participation as "discoverable only 
in the work, not before it," as the "state of 
dynamic interaction [of content and form]" (630). 
This process, too, is an "intimate" one that for 
Williams is never quite suited to public reading 
(MacGowan, Letters 281), but requires complete 
subject engagement. It seems to be the spirit in 
which Williams names his first collection, Al Que 
Quiere!, which he translates for Marianne Moore 
in a 1917 letter as "To him who wants it," with the 
sarcastic sounding alternate English title, "The 
Pleasures of Democracy" (Selected Letters 40). 
Relative to the project in Paterson, Williams' 
career preoccupation is with the relationship 
between letters and democracy, poetry and its 
many voices. Knowledge, in a human way, "a 
common language" is only palpable within the 
field of the poem, and so, in truth, "men die 
miserably every day / for lack / of what is found 
there" (Williams, Collected Poems 318). 
Language, then, with its obligation "to speak 
in a language we can understand" (xiii), is the 
living   concept   of   the   Paterson   project:   to 
"unravel" such a language in its generative, 
creative use (7). Treated as imitation, this process 
derives from mimesis, which we may distinguish 
from diegesis and language in its expository, 
practical use. The project represents a form of 
dialogism for Williams, in which "the dialect is 
the mobile phase, the changing phase, the 
productive phase" (Williams, Selected Letters 
291). For the poet exploring place, in "a roar that 
(soundless) drowns the sense" (Williams, Paterson 
97), there is productivity in meaninglessness. 
Still, the project runs against and must contend 
with the use of language in its practical, purpose- 
laden use. 
The poet reveals at times the extent to which 
the text is a direct result of measuring: "I cannot 
say / more than how. The how (the howl) only / is 
at my disposal (proposal)" (17). An assonant 
rhyme in this case is a rudimentary metrical 
equivalence experienced in the poet's use of 
language. Here, specifically, the "how [and] 
howl," or "disposal [and] proposal" also share 
some identity in function to Williams' poetic 
process. There may be no syntactical reason for 
the rhyming iterations, but paradigmatically they 
strengthen the sense of each sign in a way that 
amplifies their didactic qualities. 
In Book I, Paterson's "thoughts the stream," 
are asleep, "abed," a dream but having "no 
language" (Williams, Paterson 23), unobserved, 
un-arrested. He is unconscious, and yet there is 
peace in ideal thought: "there moves in his sleep a 
music that is whole, unequivocal" (59), having no 
particular object; this is pure noise, a "roar" or 
"voice" as a generative force. In Selected Essays, 
Williams also discusses dream qualities as the 
language object in poetic composition: "the 
subject matter of the poem is always 
phantasy–what is wished for, realized in the 
['dream'] of the poem–but [the structure confronts] 
something else," (283). This "something else" is 
reality or, namely, the material texture of 
language, which we can describe as prosody, or 
speech in some particular resonance or responsive 
embodiment. Our poet's imperative at the start of 
book one, "–Say it, no ideas but in things–" 
(Paterson 6), is an emphasis of the necessary 
experiential genesis for our language. 
In Book II, Williams includes excerpts of 
correspondence, letters exchanged with Marcia 
Nardi, who is trying to find work in the field of 
letters and whom Williams in fact is unable to aid, 
defaulting in fact with recommendation "to apply 
to one of the Federal Employment Bureaus and let 
them instruct you" (Williams, Paterson 268). The 
poet and his interlocutor are at an impasse or 
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"blockage" creative capacity because of a non- 
response: "the outcome of my failure with you has 
been the complete damming up of all my creative 
capacities in a particularly disastrous manner such 
as I have never before experienced" (45), she 
writes. For her, there was no regenerative force, 
or sounding act in response to the letters, their 
"real contents" ignored. And yet Paterson is the 
response to those particulars–"exiling one's self 
from one's self – have you ever experienced it?" 
(45), she asks, to which the persona responds with 
poetic profession and knowledge as proof : "How 
do I love you? These!." Williams responds 
indirectly through the outset shell of Mr. Paterson, 
exiled poet as he is, grappling with the perceptions 
of the characters he has imbued: 
 
(He hears! Voices . indeterminate! Sees 
them / moving, in groups, by twos and 
fours – filtering / off by way of the many 
bypaths.). (45) 
 
Against this clatter of aimless purpose Williams 
introduces the idea of Poet as auditor, "I listen to 
the water falling (No sound of it here but with the 
wind!) This is my entire occupation" (46), creating 
a new ground in a kind of leveling act in which 
new figures may emerge. Listening so, with such 
technique, is the way for poet as a bearer of 
language to ward off the "indeterminate" 
animalism of the voices on "the many bypaths." 
There is something about the even division of 
"twos and fours" that Williams finds transparent, 
bland, lifeless and uninspired. The "filtering" 
through these phenomena presents a truly boorish 
quality to the voices that take the same paths, 
taking their lowest common function. 
A 'certain' knowledge prioritizes embodiment 
over recognition; truly, for any dog or so 
'animated [an] automaton,' death is required to be 
"well in…body" (Williams, Paterson 3-5). By 
contrast, learning confined to abstraction, to the 
'safety' of mind alone may well be a different way 
of death, in its fixity, being flat and "unwilling or 
enable" to take shape, as "like beds always made 
up" (5). As the poet must beware "the craft, / 
subverted by thought" (4), we all must beware the 
primacy of thought (itself) as it may be calculated 
toward use of language. Williams will illustrate 
this well, measuring this stance as if it were to 
marriage, itself one act, to be made and not 
maintained, ownership of man over woman: "A 
marriage riddle: / So much talk of the 
language–when there are no / ears" (106). Yet the 
'dog' here makes poetry; his scope is 'poetic 
knowledge,'  metonymic  of  all  craft.     In  the 
Emersonian sense, such knowledge is not of self 
and self-identity; it is   rather an ongoing 
commitment to the nature of 'not self' (cf. Eliot). 
Williams'  early  commitment  to  such  a  new 
relationship with knowledge is in his emphasis on 
time, and more precisely experience in time, by 
which the truth of certain knowledge claims must 
be continually tested and reproved. Williams 
contrasts  the  products  of  poetry  to  those  of 
philosophy and science in an essay from 1929, 
collected in The Embodiment of Knowledge: 
 
Obviously there is no tolerance for sham 
or lies in either science of philosophy. 
But within the category of each there is 
the  same  congruence  as  the  infinitely 
more  sensitive  relationships  of  great 
art–in which only does the time element 
enter, in that the same truth in art must be 
restated continually in each age in the 
materials of that age to be true: whereas 
the   crudity   and grossness   of   both 
philosophy  and  science  is  that  they 
attempt to do away with time in an absurd 
absolute which–by the very lack of time 
makes them–to say the least inhuman. 
(Embodiment 88) 
 
To insist that time is necessary to our experience 
is a conspicuously obvious statement, yet in his 
emphasis of the experience of knowledge acting in 
time, Williams demands our full attention.  This, 
in short, is a kind of artistic temporization;2  it is 
part of the organic structure of poetic experience 
that anyone engaged with reading poetry is also 
engaged  with  its subject. Knowledge of this 
subject has no objective standard, moreover, rather 
it is the reader who supplies her own relative 
measure.  This function is dialogic, inclusive of 
the reader and the subject embodied in language. 
The composer John Cage holds that music by 
nature in its ephemeral characteristics offers a 
promise of development in space: "instantaneous 
and unpredictable, nothing is accomplished by 
writing, hearing or playing a piece of music; our 
ears are now in excellent condition" (621).  The 
process itself, then, is its own product, its own 
result. Engagement  therein  is  relative  to  the 
presence of a listener, outside of which there is 
 
2 If we derive from two definitions, "to act to suit the 
time or occasion" and to "temporarily adopt a 
particular course in order to conform to the 
circumstances" a term, 'to temporize' implies a 
measure of present time and a suspension of prior 
knowledge ("Temporize"). 
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nothing left to become old or stagnant. We may 
compare this to the walking step of Mr. Paterson, 
which embodies musical time purely in action, 
willful though not cognitively deliberate. 
If language itself has a body, then it is also 
based in temporal dimension.  Words on a page 
are spatial,  but  language in  use  is temporal. 
Temporal perception in verse relies in essence on 
some measure, which is not to say some subjective 
measure, purely at the whim of the reader. Rather 
what we are discussing is that which may often be 
referred to as 'implied.' Indeed, "measure implies 
something  that  can  be  measured"  (Williams, 
Letters 337).  Its meter then can be consciously 
and  objectively  established  as  measure  gets 
enacted. 
Throughout "Sunday in the Park," the voice of 
the  poem  is  one  persona,  but  its  perspective 
changes (mostly) between Mr. Paterson and the 
figure   of   the   Poet,   third   and   first-person, 
respectively.  When  Paterson  speaks  in  the 
opening lines, he speaks in the first-person voice, 
but the frame is self-referential–"myself / my"– 
and looking "outside" (Williams, Paterson 43). 
Here the poet's voice takes over, describing what 
Mr. Paterson sees in a third-person narrative. The 
poet persona is observing Mr. Paterson as "he 
moves,  /  his  voice  intermingling  with  other 
voices"  (56),  and  in  this  sense  it  is  purely 
descriptive or  object-oriented, one among 
particulars, "Voices! / multiple and inarticulate 
voices / clattering loudly…" (54). This revelation 
of process is limited to a passive receptivity, as are 
"the binoculars chained / to anchored stanchions" 
at the limits of the park (55).  Mr. Paterson, in 
body, is like an apparatus in the process of the 
poem. 
In the roar of the falls, a force of nature in 
action, his thoughts give way against a the new 
current or ground, to the noise or howl of pure 
voice needing expression in language, where only 
certain figures emerge. "[The] voice in his voice" 
(56) is the active voice, the first person persona, or 
poet, watching Paterson and addressing the poem. 
Sometimes he is in step with Mr. Paterson; 
however, the poet must also depart. His outward 
view does not have its end in containing or 
aggregating all voices. For this poet, living 
persona, complexity and multitude are too 
indeterminate or perhaps too dissonant for 
common language to reflect knowledge; simple 
"elemental" measure, rather, is the goal, and the 
approach must be concrete. This persona knows 
that Paterson’s time is kept in his walk–and not 
knowledge of walking, i.e. 'how to walk,' but the 
activity,  "Walking–"  (44,  45,  47,  52,  58). 
Repeated on the hard left margin or, notably, the 
limit of the text, this phrase becomes a type of 
prosodic cadence, or resolution, by which measure 
takes its leveling, "by twos and fours–filtering" 
(45).  Against it, grounded so, the conscious and 
creative persona may mark time, where the reader 
may take its measure. The effect on Williams' part 
is a verse and 'Metaverse,' hung on indentation, 
punctuation, dashes and double-periods (e.g. 44). 
Mr.  Paterson's  voice  is  "unheard"  (55),  but 
voicing, counting, stepping is "kindling his mind 
more / than his mind will kindle" (56).  For the 
poet, this kindling must find its equivalent in 
language (that is, in prosody, embodied language). 
Still yet such discovery is an act of invention and 
innovation, whereby, in a dialogue of imitation 
and  meaning,  a  creative  capacity  or  creative 
environment emerges.  He is composing, in John 
Cage's sense of music of the world, in an act of 
"Purposeful purposelessness" (622). 
Williams describes this as a "field" of 
knowledge: "[the head is] art–the palpable shape 
of our lives presented in the only way which as 
sensible creatures we are capable of making it 
objective" (Embodiment 85). Poetry is a 'field' of 
objective ontology (by count, by temporization) 
and subjective epistemology, where knowledge is 
held. The "poet's proof" (287) is made as it is 
heard and experienced. For example, when he 
speaks "– a flight of empurpled wings! … 
invisibly created ... – aflame in flight – aflame 
only in flight" (278), he shows the measure, in this 
case of temporal limits, to be both a condition for 
and substance of the experience. 
Nonetheless, such measure requires an 
intimate technique. The persona's imploring, 
vocative case addresses each reader–"you"– 
keeping them in close proximity in the act of 
creation and the temporization of poetic 
knowledge. Invention in this case is in no way 
static, since it requires new experience; it requires 
innovation: 
 
Without invention nothing is well spaced, 
unless the mind change, unless 
the stars are new measured, according 
to their relative positions, the 
line will not change, the necessity 
will not matriculate … 
(Williams, Paterson 50) 
 
Without invention, the necessity for space does 
not register, and yet a space is necessary for 
invention; therefore the creation of space, or 
conditions, for invention must be part of the 
invention itself, as it is with play in music.  This 
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then is the purpose of counting, for Williams, 
which in order to innovate needs to become 
conscious again and again, to be something we 
find in the experience. Reflecting to Cid Corman 
on the dominance of older forms, Williams notes, 
"Instinctively we have continued to count as 
always but it has become not a conscious process 
and being unconscious has descended to a low 
level of the invention" (Essays 340). Along with 
measure, by one means counting, "music-ing" or 
sounding becomes the force for change–not for 
strictness of new figures, but for their 
interpretation. Book III of Paterson provides 
space for the noise of desolation, disembodied 
language–the "roar of books" (Williams, Paterson 
100)–the lifeless environment where only a 
mutable form can survive: "What language could 
allay our thirsts, / what winds lift us, what floods 
bear us / past defeats / but song but deathless 
song?" (108). In music, this Open Form that 
Williams explores, causes our ears to be "jogged" 
(Essays 340) and we are compelled to listen if we 
are at all to enter the field of the subject. This 
activity comes built into the artifact, like a dance 
required for the experience. 
Consider further an imposition of time from 
"Sunday in the Park:" "Time! Count! Sever and 
mark  time!"  (Williams,  Paterson  56). The 
persona of the poet in action asks us all to listen 
and measure, hearing how language gets made. 
Composition   and   painting   of   experience   is 
required to inspire belief in such thought; "We 
believe always by coming, in some sense, to see" 
writes Berry (1). Order of counting, realization of 
meter–implied or deliberate–is required  to 
generate poetic experience, just as it is to perform 
music. As meter is for music, for verse to be 'in' a 
certain meter implies qualities of size and number. 
When reciting passages of verse, even if the verse 
is not regular, one relies on a sense of rhythm, if 
generated  purely  from  the  word  stress  and 
prosodic  long  and  short  that  are  raw  textural 
features of any spoken line. Williams' world 
evokes  the  call  of  poet  persona–he  invokes 
listeners to "(use a metronome / if your ear is 
deficient…)" (55) –"his voice" suggesting that an 
applied meter obviates the space in which phrases, 
words and their syllabic rudiments (phonemic, 
morphemic) become discernible  objects  of 
experience. Knowledge of and  in  experience 
depends on a creative event; to express knowledge 
at all, we must in this sense make it together. 
For Williams, invention in poetry requires a 
new craft or poetic process, of which measure is 
both a device and a goal. Reflecting on traditional 
approaches, Williams bemoans the ideality of 
structure: 
 
The one thing the poet has not wanted to 
change, the one thing he has clung to in 
his dream–unwilling to let go–the place 
where the time-lag is still adamant–is 
structure. Here we are unmovable. But 
here is precisely where we  come into 
contact with reality. Reluctant, we waken 
from our dreams. And what is reality? 
How do we know reality? The only 
reality that we can know is MEASURE 
(Selected Letters 283). 
 
Williams' discussion of the meaning of dreams is 
indirect here, meaning purity and ideality in 
thought, but the dream of structure is so 
established that it easily mobs the individual 
experience: 
 
Signs everywhere of birds nesting, while 
in the air, slow, a crow zigzags 
with heavy wings before the wasp-thrusts 
of smaller birds circling about him 
that dive from above stabbing for his eyes 
(Williams, Paterson 46) 
 
For the following excerpt, the metaphor of 
rumours can be interpreted too as voices colliding; 
"conversant with eccentricities," "bearing" 
asymmetries as natural phenomena, and yet 
struggling to meet one another in representation, 
in meaning of common language. The following 
lines demand to be heard and scrutinized with a 
technique of listening and interest in knowledge 
within the field of the poem. 
one unlike the other, twin 
of  the other,  conversant with 
eccentricities 
side by side, bearing the water drops 
 
and snow, vergent, the water soothing the 
air when 
it   drives   in   among   the   rocks   fitfully– 
(Williams, Paterson 25) 
 
This verse and those preceding  it  offer a 
phenomenal metaphor for the relationship between 
language and object, between speech and thought: 
"by the flood" we know "the storm" (25). By the 
steady flow of the stream, the air and water are as 
"brother  /  to  brother,  touching  as  the  mind 
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touches" (24), in basic correspondence, but there 
is also a relationship defined by what the river 
"brings in…[it] brings in rumors of separate / 
worlds" (25), leaving something behind, which, 
for Williams, shows a  measuring relationship. 
This parallel correspondence underlies an idea of 
analog knowledge (e.g. in artifact, in apparatus), 
with measure at the basis of the meaning. Also, at 
the falls they encounter something else: a 
language in embodied speech, in sound. 
The verse texture,3 how each line sounds, is 
born out in recitation. An effect of rhythmic 
tension and resolution in this case depends upon a 
strong implied pulse (of three), and a syllabic 
pulse (of four), which gives the line momentum, 
as in the phrase, 'pass the salted butter.' A bi- 
rhythm of four beats against three can be 
represented in musical notation as follows, where 
the accented notes 'resolve' or come together every 
twelve subdivisions (Drums 103): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a 'phasing effect' at places with the least 
stable resolution, such "and snow, vergent, the 
water soothing the air when" (25). 
We may say that these qualities of bi-rhythms 
(4:3), moving apart and coming together, among 
other elements of prosody, satisfy a test for 
onomatopoeia. Eichenbaum, in describing tenets 
of 'Russian formalism,' posits prosody to have an 
"independent oral function" in verse that is not 
"merely onomatopoetic" (1068). The expression 
or texture of the language is behaving like the 
object expressed. But how so? In the case of a bi- 
rhythm, two 'unlike' numbers are locked in a 
temporal relationship. The sensation of the 
spoken rhythm is of bouncing, colliding, but it is 
most apparent precisely through the possibility of 
resolution; a measured view depends on 
perspective, on actual reading of the verse, 
creating the space for hearing it, even counting if 
necessary. The structure or "texture" of the thing 
remains still relative, or subject-dependent, 
however, even while there is specific material to 
be resolved measured by the reader. Such an 
approach to measure may be compared to 
approaches to musical rhythm outside of the 
Europeanized tradition.  According to Montfort, 
 
3 cf. Dundes, "Text, Texture and Context" 
"The concept of time in African music has a 
different emphasis than that of the West:" "the 
African approach to rhythm does not limit itself to 
one meter at a time," and "one pulse," but instead 
has a "larger time span" as a "unifying principle" 
(7). Such music is, moreover, derived from 
cultural practice and has “developed as part of 
community life. Poetically speaking, the measure 
depends upon an act of sound (cf. Olson, "ear to 
the syllables," 215). To derive the bi-rhythm, in 
this case, is not necessary to experience its effect. 
Yet it may be done as counting functions as a 
meter, much like a ruler–except that length 
represents time–by which we may group and 
subdivide. 
One of Williams' tactical solutions to 
uncovering a process of measure in Paterson is to 
"write carelessly so that nothing that is not green 
will survive" (129). This is a challenge to 
linguistic structuralism–for example, to Roman 
Jakobson's claim that "[poetic] function, by 
promoting the palpability of signs, deepens the 
fundamental dichotomy of signs and objects" 
("Linguistics and Poetics" 1264). Uncovering 
what is "green" or living in poetic language 
depends may depend for Williams upon a measure 
of non-intention, but the consequences of the 
language are still concrete, they still "may destroy 
the world" (Williams, Paterson 129). This leads 
us to ask, even where the poetic function is 
onomatopoeic, whether 'structure' itself and its 
emotive content are meaningful in a semantic way, 
or whether these are merely texture? Williams 
might argue that this relationship is real and is 
sprung from the subject's own experience or 
embodiment of knowledge. In this example the 
"rumours" are object-voices which the persona 
foregrounds at their most intermingled state, 
"vergent, the water soothing the air when / it 
drives in among the rocks fitfully–" (24). The 
dash breaks the line, an arrested resolution from 
the now forward rolling triplet meter, which itself 
resolves from the tension created by preceding 
enjambed lines. The effect proves a mimesis of 
the objects discussed; language too becomes a 
'fitful' place for ideas at the moment the reader 
takes their resolve in its "auding:" "the process of 
hearing, recognizing, and interpreting spoken 
language" ("Auding"). There is an interplay of 
the receptive and the creative, in the responsive 
voice, the act of saying-in-meeting. 
"The stone lives, the flesh dies" (Williams, 
Paterson 49). Stone represents potential. It can 
take shape and be given shape. This is "love," "a 
relationship…a weight, a substance, endlessly in 
flight" (49); it has neither a fixed identity nor a 
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conspicuous one and therefore it has a kind of 
permanence. And yet there is identity in an 
embodied use of voice. Language takes a measure 
to have literal significance or to behave 
concretely; and from the concrete substance, "the 
stone," comes possibility of "invention:" 
derivative construct (measure) vs. "aimless," 
inarticulate rhythm (Williams, Essays 337). In 
order to arrive at the 'common language,' the 
"voice within the voice" sifts through the 
vulgarity, wanton pleasures and calculated 
violence; the poet has to "Cut / out that stuff" 
which is destructive (Williams, Paterson 52), as 
"feet     . aimlessly / wandering" are to 
poetry (54). He compares this with dogs' 
behaviour, basic but persistent: "I took sticks and 
stones after the dog but he wouldn't beat it" (54). 
Language is simply a noise of referential 
multiplicity unless it is engaged with purposeful 
measure or "counter-weight" (48). 
Williams writes to Denise Levertov: "a poem 
is made up not of the things of which it speaks 
directly but of the things which it cannot identify 
and yet yearns to know" (Letters 8). This 
suggestion implies a sought after, spontaneous but 
ultimately unstable resolution through poetry, in 
order to have "an elucidation by multiplicity" 
(Williams, Paterson 61); such potential must be 
counter-weighted by a raw noise, un-instantiated 
voice or material of measure. Cushman's 
etymology of "measure" is "to be meet, that is, 
commensurate, fitting or appropriate" (139), 
speaking with material weight. Corydon 
admonishes, " If th i s were rhyme,  
Sweetheart….But the measure of it is the 
thing…and without batting an eye /  .  " 
(Williams, Paterson 163)–she is struck out here 
from actually continuing at the implied fourth beat 
of this idiomatic cadence of narrative. 
Only through attention to language may one 
"Music it" for oneself (29), and the knowledge 
which therein takes its body is of a relative kind. 
Cushman's description is perhaps narrow  if it 
refers to some particular, authored, or original 
poetic act of imitation, since this would preclude 
the reiteration of sounding out the poem. This 
may be by way of interpretation, but more likely 
by that of accent and meter, and therefore offers 
variations on structure within the metered Gestalt. 
"If structure," John Cage writes, then "rhythmic 
structure" (623). If only by heartbeat or gait, each 
of us has a natural rhythm and each brings a 
unique sense of timing to the structure of the 
poem. For Williams, nonetheless, language 
resides in a commonality of exchange that makes 
it far too important for its serious treatment to be 
relegated to art alone. However, art and, in 
particular, music offer by far the richest 
possibilities for ensuring that the dialogic process 
of imbuing language with meaning does not 
stagnate. Only in a body of musical technique can 
poetic language find its necessary capacity for life. 
Poetic measure, then, is not just about mimesis of 
equivalence for its own sake, but is a home for 
real knowledge and indeed the most common 
experience. 
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